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Abstract  
This paper documents a large cross-bank and cross-country variation in the relationship between 
loan loss provisions and the business cycle and explores bank management specific, bank-activity 
specific and country specific (institutional and regulatory) features that explain this diversity in the 
European Union. Our results indicate that LLP in large, publicly traded and commercial banks, as 
well as in banks reporting in consolidated statements’ format, are more procyclical. Better investor 
protection and more restrictive bank regulations reduce the procyclicality of LLP. Additional 
evidence shows that moral hazard resulting from deposit insurance renders LLP more procyclical. 
We do not find support for the view that better quality of market monitoring mitigates the risk-
taking behavior of banks. Our findings clearly indicate the empirical importance of earnings 
management for LLP procyclicality. Sensitivity of LLP to the business cycle seems to be limited in 
the case of banks which engage in more income smoothing and which apply prudent credit risk 
management.     
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1. Introduction 
The procyclicality of loan loss provisions (LLP) varies from bank-to-bank as well as from country-
to–country.  In this study we aim to find out what factors explain such diversity of LLP 
procyclicality. To solve this problem we resort to risk management hypothesis, according to which 
banks and supervisors define a specific level of protection against loan losses and banks keep 
reserves for expected losses. This hypothesis emphasizes that having properly measured provisions 
against expected losses is likely to lessen fluctuations in recorded bank profitability and could mean 
that bank behavior becomes less sensitive to the business cycle (Borio et al., 2001:26). In the same 
vein, Fonseca and Gonzalez (2008:218) state that provisions should move in step with income 
(increase when bank profitability increases and decrease in times of declining bank efficiency) and 
with economic cycle. Laeven and Majnoni (2003), Bikker and Metzemakers (2005) and Bouvatier 
and Lepetit (2008, 2010) analyze the influence of economic growth on LLP, arguing that the 
strength of this influence may be reduced through forward–looking provisioning (e.g. income-
smoothing). Empirical evidence suggests that banks do engage in earnings management (i.e. income 
smoothing and capital management; see Beaver and Engel, 1996; Ahmed et al., 1999 for this 
distinction) as well as in credit risk management. At the same time, however, this research fails to 
prove any countercyclical behavior of LLP. On the contrary, it does prove that LLP behave 
procyclicaly.   
Analysis of results of the above mentioned papers shows that the relationship between LLP 
and the business cycle (as a proxy for procyclicality) as well as bank profits (as a proxy for income 
smoothing), bank capital (as a proxy for capital management) and loan growth (as a proxy for credit 
risk management) is marked by visible diversity. This research, however, focuses mainly on the 
drivers of heterogeneity of earnings management, in particular income smoothing, and not on the 
factors which may affect the sensitivity of LLP to the business cycle. For example, Fonseca and 
Gonzalez (2008) focus on both bank specific and country specific determinants of income 
smoothing and conclude that at the cross country level, negative effects of income smoothing seem 
to be affected by investor  protection, accounting disclosure, supervision, financial structure and 
development.  
This paper extends previous research by focusing on the determinants of LLP procyclicality 
in the EU banks’ sample, and not on the drivers of the application of loan loss accounting to 
managing earnings and capital, as this issue has already been extensively investigated. Therefore, 
our research is substantially different from previous studies in several ways. First, we analyze 
differences in LLP procyclicality stemming from specific characteristics of a bank’s activity, i.e. 
bank type (publicly traded versus commercial privately held), bank specialization (commercial, 
cooperative, savings, bank holding) and bank size (large, medium, small). In this area we also look 
at how the sensitivity of loan loss provisions to the business cycle in the case of banks which report 
their accounting figures in consolidated financial statements differs from the case of banks which 
report in unconsolidated financial statements. Second, considering the fact that at the international 
level bank risk management, proxied by income smoothing, may be influenced by country-specific 
environment measured by political-economy variables (i.e. quality of investor protection, financial 
sector structure and development, efficiency of bank regulation and supervision in limiting bank 
risk; see e.g. Fonseca and González, 2008), we ask whether those determinants affect LLP 
sensitivity to the business cycle? Finally, as the sensitivity of individual bank’s LLP to the business 
cycle is predicted to depend on the bank’s risk management behavior (see e.g. Borio et al., 2001), 
we explore the relationship between LLP procyclicality and income smoothing, capital management 
and risk management at the individual bank’s level.  
In our research we use individual financial information on banks operating in the European 
Union in 1996-2011 available in the Bankscope database. To test the hypotheses explaining the role 
of specific characteristics of banking activity and the impact of country specific determinants we 
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apply the generalized method of moments (GMM) estimators developed for dynamic models of 
panel data by Blundell and Bond (1998). To explore the role of loan loss accounting in LLP 
procyclicality, we use the OLS estimation technique to individual banks’ data and calculate 
individual bank measures of LLP procyclicality, income smoothing, capital management and 
earnings management. Those indicators are applied in a multiple OLS regression to test the impact 
of income smoothing, capital management and default risk management on LLP procyclicality.   
Our results indicate that LLP of large, publicly traded and commercial banks, as well as of banks 
reporting in consolidated statements’ format, are more procyclical than banks in other subsamples. 
Better investor protection and more restrictive bank regulations reduce the procyclicality of LLP. 
Additional evidence shows that moral hazard resulting from deposit insurance renders LLP 
procyclical. We do not find support for the view that better quality of market monitoring mitigates 
the risk-taking behavior of banks resulting in procyclicality of LLP. Our findings suggest the 
importance of income smoothing, capital management and default risk management for LLP 
procyclicality, since sensitivity of LLP to business cycle seems to be limited in banks whose profits 
are more stable and who apply prudent credit risk management. 
This study is relevant to current policy debate on the role of size in procyclical behaviour of 
banks. In particular we provide new evidence that large systemically important banks should be 
regulated more restrictively, as they have tendency to take on more risks, as is evident in our results 
for banks who are obliged to report in consolidated statements’ format. This provides support to the 
Basel Committee capital standards for systemically important financial institutions (SIFIs), included 
in the Basel III framework. Our results are also important to current macroprudential policy 
proposals, promoting the forward looking provisioning (by the Basel Committee and other 
international institutions, such as International Monetary Fund). In particular, we find support for 
the view that more income smoothing and prudent risk management result in less procyclicality of 
LLP. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2  discusses the hypotheses regarding 
determinants of LLP procyclicality. Section 3 describes the dataset and empirical methodology. 
Section 4 reports empirical results. Finally, Section 5 presents conclusions and implications for 
further research. 
2. Literature review and hypotheses development 
2.1.  Bank determinants 
 
According to Laeven and Majnoni (2003), Bikker and Metzemakers (2005), Bouvatier and Lepetit 
(2008) banks’ accounting practices in the area of loan loss provisions (LLP) are procyclical when 
the relationship between loan loss provision and GDP is negative. Whereas the above mentioned 
authors provide empirical evidence of LLP procyclicality, they also hint that its negative effects 
may be alleviated through usage of more forward looking provisioning instead of backward-looking 
one (see also Borio et al., 2001).  
In the literature there seems to be a consensus that banks may be engaged in loan loss 
accounting to manage earnings and capital (Koch and Wall, 2000; Floro, 2010). Earnings 
management is aimed at reducing the volatility of banks income, and is extensively analyzed in the 
empirical literature focused on testing the hypothesis of income smoothing by both industrial firms 
and banks (Greenawalt and Sinkey,1988; Collins et al., 1995; Healy and Whalen, 1999; Dechov and 
Skinner, 2000; Wall and Koch, 2000; Beatty et al., 2002; Kanagaretnam et al., 2003; Goel and 
Thakor, 2003; Liu and Ryan, 2006). Liu and Ryan (2006) posit that banks prefer their allowances 
for loan losses do not fluctuate too much, in order to avoid scrutiny by bank regulators, auditors and 
market participants. The primary way that banks can reconcile these preferences is by exercising 
discretion over LLP, for example by accelerating charge-offs when allowance for loan losses would 
otherwise be too low. Such behaviour of banks leads to prudent calculation of expected losses 
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which may reduce the impact of  external economic conditions on bank loan loss provisions. 
Following this argument, we expect that the LLP of banks which apply more income smoothing 
will be less procyclical. 
Banks may also use LLP to manage their capital. Traditional capital management hypothesis 
states that bank managers use LLP to reduce expected regulatory costs associated with violating 
capital requirements, a negative relationship being predicted between capital ratios and loan loss 
provisions for the US (Beatty at al., 1995; Ahmed et al., 1999; Galai et al., 2003; El Sood, 2011). 
We posit that banks prefer to have a steadily increasing amount of capital, as it is a nominator of 
capital adequacy ratio, and with the expansion of their credit activity it helps them keep stable level 
of capital adequacy ratio. A stable capital adequacy ratio should make a bank’s  lending activity less 
sensitive to recessions and less procyclical. This may also result in a more stable level of the bank’s 
income and henceforth LLP over the business cycle, making it less procyclical. 
Changes in total loans outstanding or in loan growth rate are related to changes in credit default 
risk. Analysis of sensitivity of LLP to loan growth rate is usually applied in the literature to explore 
the so called risk management hypothesis (Laeven and Majnoni, 2003; Bikker and Metzemakers, 
2005; Fonseca and González, 2008). Banks which provision more when loan growth is stronger 
should be less prone to macroeconomic conditions. This argument leads us to prediction that in the 
case of such banks loan loss provisions will  be less procyclical. 
 
2.1.1. Specific features of a bank – bank type, bank specialization and 
bank size. 
 
The literature has traditionally forecasted that publicly traded firms engage more in income 
smoothing (Burgstahler and Dichev, 1997; Degeorge et al., 1999). Beatty et al. (2002) investigate 
the validity of the earnings management explanation by examining the stream of earnings’ changes 
and the components of these changes for publicly vs. privately held banks during 1988-1998. They 
posit that the public versus private distinction is of great importance because shareholders of public 
banks are more likely than those of private banks to rely on simple earnings–based heuristics, such 
as comparisons of current and prior period earnings, in assessing bank performance (see Beatty and 
Harris, 1998:302-303). Therefore it is very probable that public bank managers encounter more 
pressure to report consistently increasing earnings. This stronger reliance of public banks on income 
smoothing may make their LLP system less procyclical.  
The role of bank specialization for procyclicality of loan loss provisions has not been formally 
tested thus far. However, we expect that specialization may matter for loan loss provisions 
procyclicality  due to the fact that the business model of a bank determines the extent to which the 
bank responds to macroeconomic conditions. For example, commercial banks which operate at a 
country or international level, may be more prone to business cycle fluctuations, and therefore their 
loan loss provisions may be more responsive to GDP changes. In contrast, cooperative banks, which 
usually operate on local markets and have a stronger relationship with their customers, both 
borrowers and depositors, are not so prone to external business cycle conditions. The same 
reasoning refers to savings banks. In effect, we expect loan loss provisions of commercial banks to 
be more sensitive to business cycle. 
Bank size may also have an impact on bank risk and therefore affect the loan loss provision 
responses to business cycle. There has been an increase in the average size of EU banks in 1996-
2011, but there is little consistency in the literature in terms of the relation between bank size and 
bank risk. Large banks may have greater chances for diversification, and therefore could better 
reduce overall risk exposure as compared to smaller banks that do not have much opportunity to 
diversify their loan portfolio (Konishi and Yasuda, 2004; Stiroh, 2006).  Government protection of 
larger banks could also result in large banks becoming “too big to fail” or “too interconnected to 
fail” (Shooner and Taylor, 2010; Stiglitz, 2010, De Haan and Poghosyan, 2012), in particular 
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financial conglomerates operating in a few sectors of financial market (e.g. banking, insurance and 
other financial products), and as the economic theory predicts, such banks undertake too many risky 
investments (see also Freixas et al., 2007). Large banks could also be more sensitive to general 
market movements than small banks focusing on traditional loan extension activity, which may lead 
to positive relation between bank size and systemic risk (Anderson and Fraser, 2000; Haq and 
Heaney, 2012). In the EU context, the problem of bank size has been accounted for in the analysis 
of factors determining bank risk (Haq and Heaney, 2012).  In 15 EMU countries the relationship 
between systemic risk of the banking sector (proxied by bank equity market beta) and bank size has 
been found to be positive (Haq and Heaney, 2012). But can we state the same about the relationship 
between loan loss provisions and the business cycle? In other words, are loan loss provisions of 
large banks, in particular those operating in conglomerates and reporting consolidated accounting 
figures, more negatively  affected by the business cycle?    
 
2.2. Country determinants 
 
2.2.1. Quality of investor protection 
 
A first set of country traits that can influence the relationship between loan loss provisions and the 
business cycle is the institutional framework in which banks conduct their business. The 
institutional framework which affects the quality of investor protection may have an effect on the 
scope of moral hazard by entrepreneurs. As Djankov et al. (2008) show, the improvement of 
regulation of investor protection, in particular in the area of self-dealing transactions leads to more 
developed financial markets. This improvement should consist in facilitating private enforcement of 
conduct for parties involved in self-dealing transactions. Such facilitating approach emphasizes 
extensive disclosure, approval procedures for transactions, and opening the door for private 
litigation when self-dealing is suspected. Djankov et al. (2008) find that high quality of investor 
protection in self-dealing transactions results in better development of stock markets.  Moreover, 
Demirgüc-Kunt and Detragiache (2002) show that a sound legal system with proper enforcement of 
rules reduces the adverse effects of deposit insurance on bank risk-taking. As is suggested by 
Fonseca and González (2008:220) this lower risk taking in countries with better investor protection 
would also diminish bank incentives to smooth income which is stable per se. Therefore we predict 
that LLP of banks who operate in countries in which investor protection framework is of high 
quality will be less sensitive to the business cycle. 
 
2.2.2. Financial sector structure and development 
 
A second important country characteristic that can influence the relationship between loan loss 
provisions and the business cycle is the structure and development of the financial sector in which 
banks operate. We account for the impact of financial sector structure on the procyclicality of LLP 
by analyzing the comparative activity and size of stock markets and banking markets in a given 
country. The characteristics of the relation between the financial structure and LLP procyclicality 
may depend on a few factors which affect managerial decisions. If banks operate in countries which 
are more market oriented and in which bank ownership is more dispersed (La Porta et al., 1999; La 
Porta et al., 2002), their managers may have more incentives to apply prudent risk management 
practices, because the greater number of users of financial statements makes accounting data very 
important in the assessment of a bank’s solvency (Fonseca and Gonzalez, 2008). In such a case, the 
procyclicality of LLP may be diminished. In the EU context, however, in which most countries 
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have rather more bank oriented financial systems the influence of the structure of the financial 
sector on LLP procyclicality may also be negative. This argument predicts little impact of increased 
market orientation on LLP procyclicality in the EU. The direction of the impact of financial sector 
structure on the sensitivity of LLP to business cycle may also depend on the format of financial 
statements in which banks are obliged to report their financial situation. For example, in the case of 
banks which report consolidated data, the role of the stock market is increased, due to greater 
transparency of their whole business. This transparency induces bank managers to provide 
information on the sound solvency of the bank, and therefore may result in prudent risk 
management. Such risk management should reduce the procyclicality of LLP in banks which report 
consolidated statements. The opposite may be true in the case of banks whose financial figures are 
published in unconsolidated statements.  
 We incorporate the influence of financial sector development on the procyclicality of LLP 
by analyzing the overall activity of the financial intermediaries and markets and the overall size of 
the financial sector. As in the case of financial sector structure, it is not straightforward to determine 
how financial development impacts on the sensitivity of LLP to the business cycle. Again, it seems 
to us that the expected direction of the impact of the financial structure on procyclicality is 
dependent on the type of financial statement, especially when analyzing the common EU market in 
which national financial markets exhibit diversity in their development. The experience of financial 
(and in particular banking) crises suggests that banks operating in countries with better developed 
financial sectors are more prone to procyclicality. United Kingdom, Portugal and Spain are good 
examples of financially developed countries with banking sectors which went under strain in the 
crisis which began in 2008. This argument suggests that better development of the financial sector 
may result in a more procyclical LLP. The influence of financial development may, however, differ 
between banks which report consolidated statements and banks reporting unconsolidated data.  
Banks operating in multiple sectors of better developed financial market (e.g. commercial and 
savings banking, insurance and investment banking) obliged to report in consolidated statements 
may be more prone to procyclicality, and consequently their LLP may be more negatively related to 
the business cycle. The opposite may be found for smaller banks, which report only unconsolidated 
data, as those banks may be less affected by the business cycle, even in well developed financial 
sectors. 
 
2.2.3. Quality of bank regulations and supervision 
 
A third group of country traits that influence the relationship between loan loss provisions and the 
business cycle consists of regulation and supervision designed to prevent bank risk-taking behavior 
and therefore to protect bank charter values. The impact of regulations which restrict the range of 
activities which banks are allowed to engage in may induce a reduced risk appetite of banks and 
thus bank stability (Barth et al., 2006). Banks which are allowed to engage in a broader range of 
activities are difficult to monitor, by both official supervisory authorities and markets, and may 
therefore be more eager to invest in riskier assets. Moreover, financial conglomerates may become 
so powerful in political and economic terms that they become “too big to discipline” and thus take 
on more risk. We therefore expect that more stringent bank regulation, limiting the range of 
activities which banks are allowed to engage in, reduces the sensitivity of LLP to the business cycle.  
Allen et al. (2011) show that bank borrowers prefer well capitalized banks, since these banks 
have greater motivation to undertake a monitoring effort, which results in improved performance of 
firms. This argument predicts that banks may prefer to increase their charter value, thus lowering 
their risk appetite (Beck et al., 2011). These effects allow us to hypothesize that more stringent 
capital regulation may limit bank risk taking, and therefore have a diminishing impact on the 
procyclicality of LLP.   
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Even if regulations are perfectly designed with the aim of reducing risk-taking incentives of 
banks resulting from the moral hazard effect of deposit insurance, they may be not enough to 
prevent banks from engaging in risky investments. Therefore, besides regulations, great importance 
in influencing banking risk  falls on supervision, conducted by both official supervisory authorities 
and  private market monitoring (Fonseca and Gonzalez, 2008). We predict that if supervisors have 
greater powers to discipline banks and reduce their incentives to undertake risk, the procyclicality 
of loan loss provisions will be weakened.  
Efficient regulation and effective supervisors obviously form an important part of the 
banking system whose aim is to counteract the negative side effects of deposit insurance. Their 
impact on bank risk taking may depend on whether or not a country has explicit  deposit insurance 
and, if so, its features (Barth et al., 2006). Across EU countries, explicit deposit insurance is a 
common practice. However, this deposit insurance scheme framework is not uniform, as there are 
differences in the way the deposit insurer can intervene in a bank to protect the deposit insurance 
fund. If the deposit insurer has enough power to affect the risk appetite of a bank, than the 
procyclicality of LLP is reduced. 
  The issue who (and how) funds deposit insurance is important, since those involved in the 
payment have the greatest incentive to prevent losses (Barth et al., 2006) and reduce the risk taking 
resulting from moral hazard. Hellman et al. (2000) and Repullo (2004) show that risk-adjusted 
deposit insurance would help to control risk taking. Inappropriately priced deposit insurance or too 
generous deposit insurance schemes, however, might increase moral hazard in banking (see e.g. 
Demiguc-Kunt and Kane, 2002; Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga, 2004), which increases risk-taking 
appetite of banks. In this context, it is worth to mention that the EU also lacks uniformity in the way 
the deposit insurance fund is collected. This lack of uniformity in the EU as well as the arguments 
above lead us to the prediction that banks operating in countries in which the moral hazard limiting 
framework is more effective in discouraging banks from risk-taking will exhibit reduced sensitivity 
of LLP to the business cycle. 
 
3. Data and research methodology  
3.1. Data 
 
We use pooled cross-section and time series data of individual banks’ balance sheet items and profit 
and loss accounts from 27 EU countries and country-specific macroeconomic indicators for these 
countries, over a period from 1996 to 2010. The balance sheet and profit and loss account data are 
taken from the Bankscope database, whereas the macroeconomic data were accessed from the 
World Bank and the IMF web pages. We conducted our study for both consolidated and 
unconsolidated data separately.  As we are interested in the impact of the business cycle on LLP 
behavior our sample consists of banks for which we have financial information covering at least a 
ten years’ time span. We exclude from our sample outlier banks by eliminating the extreme bank-
specific observations when a given variable adopts extreme values. Since most of these institutions 
are located in Ireland, the number of countries included in the final sample drops to 26.  Based on 
this selection strategy, the number of banks included in our sample ranges from a minimum of 357 
in the case of consolidated statements’ data (3836 observations and 27 countries)  to a maximum of 
2219 in the case of unconsolidated data (22096 observations and 26 countries). We conduct our 
empirical study separately for unconsolidated data and for consolidated data, to account for the fact 
that the type of financial statements’ format may affect bank managers’ responses to the business 
cycle as well as bank managers’ decisions in the area of earnings management.  
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3.1.1. Indicators of the quality of investor protection 
 
To measure the quality of investor protection we use two variables, one is the anti self-dealing 
index, drawn from Djankov et al. (2008), and the other the creditor protection index. The anti self-
dealing index (ANTISELFDEALING), and its constituent parts (ex-ante-control and ex-post-
control), constitute a new measure of the legal protection of minority shareholders against 
expropriation by corporate insiders. This index specifically addresses the protection of minority 
shareholders against self-dealing transactions benefiting controlling shareholders (Djankov et al., 
2008:461). The anti self-dealing index comprises ten variables and ranges from 0 (weak investor 
protection) to 10 (strong investor protection). As in Djankov et al. (2008) we use the first principal 
component of this variable. 
As we mentioned above, besides the anti-self-dealing index, we consider its constituent 
parts, i.e.  EXANTECONTROL and EXPOSTCONTROL indices, which measure investor 
protection before the contract is signed and after the decision is made, respectively. Following 
Djankov et al. (2008) we apply first principal components of those indices, with higher values of 
these measures indicating stronger investor protection. 
Creditor rights protection index (CREDITORP) is an index aggregating creditor rights and 
was constructed by La Porta et al. (1998), and updated by Djankov et al. (2007).  This index ranges 
from 0 (weak credit rights) to 4 (strong creditor rights) and measures four powers of secured lenders 
in bankruptcy: (1) whether there are restrictions, such as creditor consent, when a debtor files for 
reorganization; (2) whether secured creditors are able to seize their collateral after the petition for 
reorganization is approved, that is, whether there is no automatic stay or asset freeze imposed by the 
court; (3) whether secured creditors are paid first out of the proceeds of liquidating a bankrupt firm; 
and (4) whether an administrator, and not the management, is responsible for running the business 
during the reorganization. 
 
3.1.2. Indicators of financial structure and financial development 
 
To explore the relation between the sensitivity of LLP to the business cycle and the financial 
structure (FINSTR) we apply the aggregated indicator constructed by Beck and Levine (2002) 
which is the first principal component of two variables that measure the comparative activity and 
size of markets and banks. Each of the underlying variables is constructed so that higher values 
indicate more market based financial systems. The first variable equals the log of the ratio of value 
traded (equal to the value of stock transactions as a share of national output) to bank credit (which  
equals the claims of the banking sector on the private sector as a share of GDP). The second 
variable equals the log of the ratio of market capitalization to bank credit. Following Beck and 
Levine (2002) we define market capitalization as the value of listed shares divided by GDP, and it is 
our measure of the size of stock markets relative to the economy. We use data for FINSTR averaged 
over the period of 1996–2010.  We take all values, i.e. value traded, bank credit and market 
capitalization from Beck et al. (2009) database updated for current data. 
We follow Beck and Levine (2002) and use Finance-Aggregate (FINDEV), which equals the 
first principal component of the two underlying measures of financial development. The first 
underlying measure is a measure of the overall activity of the financial intermediaries and markets. 
It equals the log of the product of private credit (the value of credits extended by financial 
intermediaries, both  bank and nonbank intermediaries, to the private sector divided by GDP) and 
value traded (the value of total shares traded on the stock market exchange divided by GDP). The 
second underlying measure of financial development is a measure of the overall size of the financial 
sector and equals the log of the sum of private credit and market capitalization. We aggregate data 
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over the period of 1996–2010.  We take all values, i.e. value traded, bank credit and market 
capitalization from Beck et al. (2009) database updated for current data. 
 
3.1.3. Indicators of restrictiveness of bank regulation and supervision 
 
The characteristics of bank regulation in each country will be incorporated through a 
measure of the scope of activities permitted to banks (REGRESTR) constructed by Barth et al. 
(2004, 2006, 2008 and 2011). We measure the regulatory restrictiveness using an index comprising 
four variables and including restrictions on securities, insurance, real estate activities plus 
restrictions on bank ownership and control of non-financial firms. We use an overall bank 
restrictiveness variable, whose values are between 4 – 16, where higher values indicate higher 
restrictiveness. Following arguments for the usage of principal components of multidimensional 
variables, given by Barth et al. (2006:183), in our quantitative analysis we chose to use the first 
principal component of the above-mentioned variable. 
We also incorporate the capital regulatory index constructed by Barth et al. (2006) as a 
measure of the stringency of capital requirements.  We explore the role of two such indices. First, 
the overall capital regulatory index (CAPREG), which is simply the sum of two components: 
overall capital stringency and initial capital stringency. Its values range from 0 to 7, with higher 
values indicating greater stringency. The other index is the initial capital stringency index 
(INITCAPSTRINGENCY), which shows whether certain funds may be used to initially capitalize a 
bank and whether they are officially verified. Again higher values of this index, which range from 0 
to 3, suggest more restrictive capital regulations.  
As the supervisory effectiveness variable we incorporate  two measures  developed by Barth 
et al. (2006, 2008): the official supervisory power (OFFSUP) and the private sector monitoring  
(PRIVMON).  The official supervisory power, ranging from 0 to 14, measures whether the 
supervisory authorities have the authority to take specific actions to prevent and correct problems, 
and indicates the power of banking supervisors to take prompt corrective action, to restructure and 
reorganize a troubled bank, and to declare a bank insolvent. Private monitoring is measured by 
private monitoring index, ranging between 0 and 11. The construction of this index is based on 
various types of information  the public can rely on to influence bank behavior (see Barth et al., 
2006:139). Higher values for both indices suggest higher supervisory powers. 
The deposit insurance scheme prevailing in a given country is a very important determinant 
of banks’ moral hazard, and therefore bank risk taking behavior. In our study we adopt the power of 
the deposit insurer index (DEPINSURANCE) developed by Barth et al. (2006), which captures the 
ability of this authority to protect the deposit insurance fund. It measures whether the deposit 
insurer has the authority to make the decision to intervene in a bank, to take legal action against 
bank directors or officials, and whether it has ever taken any legal action against bank directors or 
officers. The values for this index range from 0 to 4, with higher values indicating more power.  
Due to the fact that deposit insurance schemes do vary across countries, and across the EU 
countries in particular, we additionally include an index which measures various factors mitigating 
the moral hazard (MORALHAZARD) developed by Barth et al. (2006). This variable ranges from 0 
to 3, with higher values indicating stronger risk-mitigating factors, and measures whether banks 
fund the deposit insurance scheme or risk-based premiums as well as whether there is a formal 
coinsurance component.  
 
3.2. The econometric model and variables description 
 
The variables chosen as possibly explanatory of LLP  are variables traditionally used for the income 
smoothing hypothesis (see Greenawalt and Sinkey, 1988; Beatty et al., 2002; Liu and Ryan, 2006) 
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modified by the inclusion of GDPG and other dummy variables (as in Laeven and Majnoni, 2003; 
Bikker and Metzemakers, 2005).  
The basic model reads as: 
                   
LLP୧,୲
൫ܶܣ௜,௧ + ܶܣ௜,௧ିଵ൯
2
	= 	ߙଵ 	+ 	ߙଶ	
ܴܱܲܨܫ ௜ܶ,௧
൫ܶܣ௜,௧ + ܶܣ௜,௧ିଵ൯
2
	+	ߙଷ	∆ܮ௜,௧ 	+ 	ߙସ	
ܥܣ ௜ܲ,௧
ܶܣ௜,௧
	 
																																						+	ߙହ	ܩܦܲܩ௧ 	+ 	 	ߙ଺ܷܰܧܯܲܮ௧ 	+ 	 	ߙ଻	 ෍ ௧ܶ
ଶ଴ଵ଴
௧ୀଵଽଽ଺ 	
+		ߙ଼	 ෍ ܥ݋ݑ݊ݐݎݕ௝
ଶ଻	௢௥	଻ଶ
௝ୀଵ 	
	 
																																																	+	 ௜ߴ +	ߝ௜,௧																																																													                                                                                                                             
 
(Eq. I) 
 
 
The dependent variable is the loan loss provision (LLP) of a bank divided by this bank’s average 
total assets (TA). The subindices i, j, t refer to the bank, the country and the year - respectively. The 
explanatory variables have been subdivided into (1) bank specific variables, namely earnings before 
LLP and taxes (PROFIT), loan growth (∆L), and capital ratio measured as the share of capital in 
total assets (CAP);  and (2) some macroeconomic variables like real growth of Gross Domestic 
Product (GDPG) and the unemployment rate (UNEMPL).  
We also include the first and second lag of the dependent variable in order to capture 
adjustment costs that constrain the complete adjustment of LLP to an equilibrium level (see Laeven 
and Majnoni, 2003; Bikker and Metzemakers, 2005 and Fonseca and González, 2008). All bank 
specific variables (LLP, PROFIT and CAP) will be normalized by the bank total assets (TA,  
average assets in the case of LLP and PROFIT) to mitigate potential estimation problems with 
heteroscedasticity. 
Elements ∑ ௧ܶ
ଶ଴ଵ଴
௧ୀଵଽଽଽ 	and	∑ ௧ܶ
ଶ଴ଵ଴
௧ୀଵଽଽ଺   relate to a set of dummy time variables. ϑ are unobservable 
bank-specific effects that are not constant over time but vary across banks. Finally, ε is a white-
noise error term.  
The relation between PROFIT and LLP is applied to track the income smoothing by banks.  
If banks use LLP to smooth earnings, then we would expect a positive relationship between 
PROFIT and LLP. Empirical research on individual banks, both single and cross-country  confirms 
that this variable and LLP are positively related (Greenawalt and Sinkey, 1988; Laeven and 
Majnoni, 2003; Bikker and Metzemakers, 2005; Liu and Ryan, 2006; Fonseca and González, 2008; 
and Bouvatier and Lepetit, 2008). The higher the positive coefficient on PROFIT the more income 
smoothing there is. A negative impact of PROFIT on LLP suggests that banks do not apply LLP to 
smooth their earnings. 
Changes in total loans outstanding are related to changes in default risk (and also credit 
risk). If banks use LLP (i.e. their portion set aside to cover expected losses) to manage credit risk, 
then the relationship between LLP and ∆L is positive. Otherwise, i.e. when banks show imprudent 
loan loss provisioning behavior, ∆L exerts a negative impact on LLP. Empirical results on this 
relationship vary. Some papers find positive influence of real loan growth on LLP (Bikker and 
Metzemakers, 2005; Fonseca and González, 2008) implying that banks set aside provisions to cover 
risks which build up during economic booms. Other studies document a negative coefficient on 
∆Loans (Laeven and Majnoni, 2003) which implies the rejection of the hypothesis of prudent loan 
loss provisioning behavior.  
Capital normalized by total assets (CAP/TA) is introduced to test the capital management 
hypothesis. The capital management hypothesis emphasizes the role of loan loss provisions in 
capital ratio variation. The relationship between CAP and LPP may be both negative and positive. If 
capital variation is more related to retained earnings than to loan loss reserves, as is the case in 
many accounting standards, the CAP may exert negative effect on LPP. Such negative coefficient 
on CAP is found by Ahmed et al. (1999) and Bikker and Metzemakers (2005). On the other hand, if 
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the capital level is more affected by the loan loss allowances set aside by banks, than the influence 
of CAP on LLP is positive. For example, Liu and Ryan (2006) find a significantly positive 
coefficient on CAP, implying that better capitalized banks recorded charge-offs more quickly than 
did poorly capitalized banks. Shrieves and Dahl (2002) and Bouvatier and Lepetit (2008) find a 
positive coefficient on CAP and suggest that this observation is in line with capital management 
hypothesis, as poorly capitalized banks increase their LLP to increase their capital base. The above 
arguments notwithstanding, we are of the opinion that the interpretation of the impact of CAP on 
LLP depends on the regulations governing the inclusion of general provisions in bank capital in a 
particular country. Therefore it seems necessary to know what the practices of EU banks are in 
setting aside general provisions. Olszak (2014) shows that banks in all EU countries compute LLP 
as a sum of both specific and general provisions. General provisions are not included in bank capital 
(with the exception of Spain, where a small part of statistical provision is a part of it), as they either 
reduce the level of bank loans or are put in other liabilities of banks (e.g. in Poland). Therefore, we 
expect a negative impact of CAP on LLP in our EU sample. 
The relation between LLP and GDP is the most interesting variable in our study, as it 
measures the degree of LLP procyclicality.  Empirical research shows that GDP is negatively 
related to LLP (Laeven and Majnoni, 2003; Bikker and Metzemakers, 2005; Bouvatier and Lepetit, 
2008; Fonseca and González, 2008). The stronger the negative coefficient of GDP the more 
procyclicality there is. Positive relationship between LLP and GDP would suggest countercyclical 
provisions and therefore support the hypothesis of prudent loan loss provisioning behaviour of 
banks emphasized by Laeven and Majnoni (2003).  
We employ UNEMPL as exogenous control variable as in other studies analyzing 
determinants of LLP (Bikker and Metzemakers, 2005). We expect the coefficient on UNEMPL to 
be positive, suggesting that LLP increase as more employees get redundant. Such a relationship is 
consistent with the procyclicality hypothesis emphasizing that loan loss provisions decrease in 
economic upswings and increase in economic downswings. 
Equation (I) involves explanatory variables that may not be exogenous. This means that 
variables are correlated with the error terms, both current and lagged. Also one may observe 
heteroskedasticity effects and autocorrelation within individuals. Additionally, the dataset which is 
analysed in the empirical part, is definitely an example of a  “short” panel, namely the panel with a 
few time periods and many individuals observed. Consequently, the nature of variables applied in 
the econometric model (1) may cause serious problems with properties of standard OLS estimators. 
Therefore, we apply an approach that involves instrumental variables. In order to limit the possible 
estimation bias we considered the system of generalised method of moments (GMM) proposed by 
Arellano and Bond (1991), and updated by Blundell and Bond (1998).  This method has a proven 
track record and seems to be the best approach to address three relevant econometric issues, that are 
inherent to our analysis: (1) the presence of unobserved bank specific effects, which is eliminated 
by taking first differences of all variables; (2) the inclusion of lags of the dependent variable needed 
to capture the dynamic nature of LLP, which brings about the autoregressive nature of the data 
regarding the behaviour of LLP; and (3) the likely endogeneity of the explanatory variables, 
mentioned above.  
We control for the potential endogeneity of PROFIT, ∆L and CAP in the two step system 
GMM estimation procedure by the inclusion of up to four lags of explanatory variables as 
instruments. The GDPG and UNEMPL, as well as the country and the time dummy variables are 
the only variables considered exogenous. As the consistency of the GMM estimator depends on the 
validity of the instruments, we consider two specification tests. The first is Hansen’s J statistic for 
overidentyfying restrictions, which tests the overall validity of the instruments tests. The second is 
the test verifying the hypothesis of absence of second-order serial correlation in the first difference 
residuals (AR(2)) and the absence of first-order serial correlation in the differentiated residuals 
(AR(2)). Such an approach gives us estimates of standard errors robust with respect to 
heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation in the dataset. The details of the procedure can be found in 
Roodman (2009).  
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3.3. Research strategy 
 
3.3.1. Specific characteristics of banking activity and country 
determinants of LLP procyclicality 
 
To measure the impact of specific characteristics of a bank activity on the procyclicality of 
loan loss provisions, i.e. bank type, bank specialization and bank size, we divide our sample into 
subsamples. To account for the role of bank type we identify two subsamples of publicly traded 
banks and privately held banks. The regression analysis will be conducted in each sample 
separately. 
To explore the role of bank specialization we conduct separate regressions in commercial, 
cooperative, savings and holding banks’ category. 
As for the influence of bank size: we divide banks into three subsamples: large, medium, 
small (30% of banks with the largest assets constitute our largest banks’ sample and 30% of banks 
with the smallest assets constitute the smallest banks’ sample; banks who are in between are 
medium sized banks). In this step we test the impact of different methods of division on the 
estimated results. We divide our banks according to the one-year-reference method (see e.g. Berger 
et al., 1995 and Zhou, 2008) and average-value-of-assets method (Beck and Levine, 2002). In the 
first method we consider a bank’s assets as of the end of 2009 or 2010. In the second method we 
first calculate average assets of a bank in a whole period 1996-2011, and then apply this average 
value at the next stage of division. This second method produces a larger sample of banks which 
can be analyzed, as it does not exclude banks for which the information on total assets failed to be 
reported in the Bankscope database.  
The role of bank size in the phenomenon of LLP procyclicality may also be captured by 
conducting a separate regression analysis for banks which report their accounting figures in the 
consolidated statement’s format and for those banks who report only unconsolidated statements, 
since banks consolidating financial data are usually large institutions which operate in financial 
conglomerates more prone to  excessive risk taking (Freixas et al., 2007). 
To analyze the differences across countries, we estimate regression (I), incorporating an 
interaction term for each country variable and the GDP variable. The coefficient of each interaction 
term measures the influence of each political - economy variable on the procyclicality of loan loss 
provisions.  Following a suggestion made by Barth et al. (2004, 2006:190-195) in their research on 
the impact of bank regulations on bank development, we use a sequential procedure to analyze the 
influence of country variables on procyclicality, by incorporating interaction terms separately rather 
than at the same time. 
 
3.3.2. Income smoothing, capital management and risk management as 
determinants of procyclicality of LLP 
 
The results of previous research indicate that there may be some connection between the accounting 
of loan loss provisioning (in its three instances, i.e.  income smoothing, capital management and 
risk management) and the procyclicality of loan loss provisions. However, the studies conducted 
thus far do not show precisely how procyclicality of loan loss provisions is impacted by the 
accounting of loan loss provisioning. This motivated us to address this question in a two stage 
procedure. At the first stage, we calculate measures of LLP procyclicality, income smoothing, 
capital management and risk management for each bank separately. We identify these measures as 
sensitivity of LLP to business cycle (GDPG and GDPG per capita), profit before provisions and 
taxes (normalized by average assets), bank capital (normalized by total assets) and loans growth. To 
measure the sensitivity of LLP to the business cycle we regress LLP against GDPG and GDPG per 
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capita, respectively. To calculate the sensitivity of LLP to income smoothing we regress LLP 
against profit before provisions and taxes. To obtain the measure of the sensitivity of LLP to bank 
capital, we regress LLP against bank capital. And finally, to measure the sensitivity of LLP to loans 
growth, we regress LLP against loans growth.  Following this approach we have five regressions for 
each bank, with regression coefficients measuring the sensitivities which we are looking for. We 
consider two types of regression models to be necessary to obtain the sensitivity measures. The first 
type, which we henceforth call regression type 1 (R1) is a single ordinary least squares model 
(OLS), which reads as follow : 
 
௅௅௉೔,೟
஺௩௘௥௔௚௘	்஺೔,೟
= ߙ௦௘௡௦௜௧ܧ ௜ܸ,௧	        Eq. (II) 
 
where:  
LLP – loan loss provision; 
Average TA – average total assets; 
i – the number of the bank; 
t – the number of observations for the i-th bank; t is not smaller than 10 years, and does not exceed 
16 years; 
αsensit –the regression coefficient which is the measure of sensitivity of loan loss provisions 
(LLP/AverateTA) to: 
 GDPG (the coefficient between LLP/AverageTA and GDPG is henceforth called 
procyclicality indicator 1, PROCI1 R1),  
 GDPG per capita (the coefficient between LLP/AverageTA and GDPG per capita is 
henceforth called procyclicality indicator 2, PROCI2 R1),  
 PROFIT (the coefficient between LLP/AverageTA and PROFIT is henceforth called income 
smoothing indicator, ISI R1); the PROFIT equals profit before provisions and taxes   
normalized by average assets, 
 CAP (the coefficient between LLP/AverageTA and CAP is henceforth called capital 
management indicator, CMI R1); the CAP equals bank capital normalized by total assets, 
 ∆L (the coefficient between LLP/AverageTA and ∆L is henceforth called risk management 
indicator, RMI R1); the ∆L equals loan growth rate. 
EV - is the explanatory variable, i.e. GDPG, GDPG per capita, PROFIT, CAP, ∆L; 
The second type is a multiple regression model, which we henceforth call regression type 2 
(R2), in which, besides the current values of the explanatory variable, we also include the lagged 
explanatory variable. This model reads as below: 
௅௅௉೔,೟
஺௩௘௥௔௚௘	்஺೔,೟
= ߙ௦௘௡௦௜௧ܧ ௜ܸ,௧ + ߚ௦௘௡௦௜௧ܧ ௜ܸ,௧ିଵ      Eq. (III) 
 
where:  
LLP – loan loss provision; 
Average TA – average total assets; 
i- the number of the bank; 
t- the number of observations for the i-th bank; t is not smaller than 10 years, and does not exceed 
16 years; 
αsensit- the regression coefficient which is the measure of sensitivity of loan loss provisions 
(LLP/AverateTA) to: 
 GDPG (the coefficient between LLP/AverageTA and GDPG is henceforth called 
procyclicality indicator 1, PROCI1 R2),  
 GDPG per capita (the coefficient between LLP/AverageTA and GDPG per capita is 
henceforth called procyclicality indicator 2, PROCI2 R2),  
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 PROFIT (the coefficient between LLP/AverageTA and PROFIT is henceforth called income 
smoothing indindicator, ISI R2); the PROFIT equals profit before provisions and taxes   
normalized by average assets, 
 CAP (the coefficient between LLP/AverageTA and CAP is henceforth called capital 
management indicator, CMI R2); the CAP equals bank capital normalized by total assets, 
 ∆L (the coefficient between LLP/AverageTA and ∆L is henceforth called risk management 
indicator, RMI R2); the ∆L equals loan growth rate. 
βsensit – the regression coefficient between LLP/AverageTA and EVi,t-1; 
EVt –  an explanatory variable, i.e. GDPG, GDPG per capita, PROFIT, CAP, ∆L; 
EVi,t-1 – a lagged explanatory variable. 
 
In the second stage we run multiple ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions (with standard 
errors of estimated coefficients robust to heteroscedasticity) in which we relate measures of LLP 
procyclicality (PROCI) to earnings management measures (ISI, CMI, RMI). Our baseline model 
reads as: 
ܴܱܲܥܫ௜ = ߚ଴ + ߚଵܫܵܫ௜ + ߚଶ	ܥܯܫ௜ + ߚଷ	ܴܯܫ௜ + ߝ௜	
          Eq.(IV) 
where: 
PROCI, ISI, CMI and RMI stand for sensitivity of LLP to business cycle, income smoothing, 
capital management and risk management, respectively; 
i – the i-th bank; 
β1– the regression coefficient measuring the impact of income smoothing on procyclicality of LLP; 
β2– the regression coefficient measuring the impact of capital management on procyclicality of 
LLP; 
β3 – the regression coefficient measuring the impact of capital management on procyclicality of 
LLP; 
β0 – a constant; 
εi – an error term. 
To gain an insight into the potential impact of earnings management on LLP procyclicality 
we look at values of β parameters. These parameters measure to what extent the procyclicality of 
LLP is influenced by income smoothing, capital management and risk management. If banks which 
engage more in income smoothing, or whose income is stable, exhibit a less procyclical behaviour 
in terms of LLP, than the association between PROCI and ISI is expected to be positive. As for the 
impact of capital management (CMI) we expect negative association, as capital management is 
exhibited by the negative coefficient on CAP. And the more negative this relationship, the more 
capital management there is. Finally, the relationship between procyclicality of LLP and credit 
default risk management (RMI) is expected to be positive.  
 
4. Empirical results 
 
Table 1 provides some descriptive statistics about variables in our estimation sample. The loan loss 
provisions over average assets (LLP) equals to 0.5 (with a standard deviation of 0.71 in 
unconsolidated data and 1.29 in consolidated data). The ratio of profit before taxes and provisions 
to average assets (PROFIT) equals  1.27 (in unconsolidated data) and 1.57 (in consolidated data). 
The average loans growth is relatively high (12.36 and 14.89) due to the fact that in our samples we 
have developing countries which went through economic transition. In such countries loans growth 
rates are relatively high. The average capital ratio (CAP) equals about 8% (i.e. 8.04% and 7.92%) 
and is close to Basel Committee standard capital adequacy ratio.  
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Table 1. Summary descriptive statistics of key regression variables (in percentage points). 
 
LLP equals loan loss provisions over average assets, PROFIT equals profit before taxes and provisions over average 
assets, CAP equals capital over total assets,  ∆L is  loan growth rate, GDPG is real growth in GDP, UNEMPL is 
unemployment rate. 
 
 
Table 2. Correlations of bank specific and macroeconomic variables.  
 
LLP equals loan loss provisions over average assets, PROFIT equals profit before taxes and provisions over average 
assets, CAP equals capital over total assets,  ∆L is  loan growth rate, GDPG is real growth in GDP,UNEMPL is 
unemployment rate. 
*, **, *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
 
Table 2 provides the correlation matrix of the regression variables (both bank specific and 
macroeconomic). The correlations indicate a statistically significant correlation between LLP and 
each of the explanatory variables. The correlation coefficient for PROFIT is positive (around 35% 
and 48% in unconsolidated and consolidated data, respectively), suggesting that banks do exercise 
income smoothing on average. The correlation between LLP and ∆L is negative in unconsolidated 
data, suggesting no risk management, and positive in consolidated data, which indicates prudent 
risk management behaviour. The positive correlation between LLP and CAP indicates that there is 
Mean Std. Dev. No. of obs. No. of banks No. of countries
LLP 0.50 0.71 28320 1770 26
PROFIT 1.27 1.35 32689 1770 26
∆L 12.36 45.42 31623 1770 26
CAP 8.04 4.97 34398 1770 26
GDPG 1.58 2.37 39996 1770 26
UNEMPL 8.59 2.56 39980 1770 26
LLP 0.49 1.29 4791 357 27
PROFIT 1.57 2.47 4869 357 27
∆L 14.89 27.73 4820 357 27
CAP 7.92 5.53 5059 357 27
GDPG 2.24 2.74 5712 357 27
UNEMPL 8.55 3.88 5694 357 27
UNCONSOLIDATED
CONSOLIDATED
LLP PROFIT ∆L CAP GDPG UNEMPL
LLP 1.0000
PROFIT 0.3529 *** 1.0000
∆L -0.0156 ** 0.0684 *** 1.0000
CAP 0.0648 *** 0.3201 *** 0.0716 *** 1.0000
GDPG 0.0574 *** 0.0145 *** -0.0082  -0.0537 *** 1.0000
UNEMPL -0.0941 *** 0.0332 *** 0.0615 *** 0.0218 *** -0.0283 *** 1.000
LLP 1.0000
PROFIT 0.4841 *** 1.0000
∆L 0.1026 *** 0.2187 *** 1.0000
CAP 0.1090 *** 0.3231 *** 0.0219 1.0000
GDPG -0.2099 *** 0.0005 0.2199 *** 0.0169 *** 1.0000
UNEMPL 0.0532 *** 0.0226 -0.0153 0.0618 *** -0.0495 *** 1.0000
UNCONSOLIDATED
CONSOLIDATED
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no capital management with LLP across EU banks. The correlation between GDPG and LLP is 
positive in unconsolidated data, suggesting countercyclical provisioning, and negative in 
consolidated data, providing support for the procyclicality of LLP. 
 
Table 3. Correlations of country specific variables. 
 
Values of ANTISELFDEALING, EXANTECONTROL, EXPOSTCONTROL are taken from Djankov et al. (2008). 
Values of CREDITORP are from Djankov et al. (2007). Values of FINSTRUCT and FINDEV are calculated following 
Beck and Levine (2002) with updated financial information. Values of CAPREG, OFFSUP, PRIVMON, 
DEPSINURANCE, MORALHAZARD and INITCAPSTRINGENCY are drawn from Barth et al. (2006). 
**, *** denote significance at 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
 
4.1. Empirical results for diversity of procyclicality of LLP stemming 
from specific characteristics of banking activity 
 
Before analyzing the diversity of LLP procyclicality across countries we first test the procyclicality 
of LLP on the full sample of banks whose unconsolidated and consolidated statements are available 
in our database. The results in the full sample of unconsolidated and consolidated data indicate a 
strong empirical evidence in favour of the hypothesis of procyclicality of LLP, as GDP has a 
negative regression coefficient (statistically significant at the 1% level). The signs of the remaining 
regression coefficients on the remaining variables are intuitive in most cases. The regression 
coefficient representing the strength of the relation of LLP with its two lagged values is positive 
(but for the second lag of consolidated data, where it is negative). This  indicates the necessity of a 
dynamic specification when modeling bank LLP variability. PROFIT is positively related to LLP, 
which suggests that banks in the EU follow income smoothing (income stabilizing) strategy. The 
regression coefficient related with CAP is significantly negative in unconsolidated data, which may 
suggest that banks in the EU apply capital management. Finally, the regression coefficient related 
with  ∆L is negative (and statistically significant in unconsolidated data), which may suggest that 
EU banks do not provision more when bank lending is rising (in terms of loan growth).  
To analyze the impact of specific characteristics of banking activity, we estimate Equation 
(I) for each subsample of banks following the criteria of bank type, bank specialization and bank 
size.  Our results in tables 5 and 6 obtained with a two-step GMM system estimator are robust to 
heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation and confirm the diversity of LLP procyclicality across banks 
distinguished by type, specialization and size. Contrary to what has been expected, the LLP 
procyclicality of publicly traded banks is stronger than the procyclicality of LLP in privately held 
banks subsample in both unconsolidated and consolidated data. In this context it is worth looking at 
our results from the perspective of income smoothing, as they show that publicly traded banks, who 
are obliged to report in consolidated statements’ format apply this practice more frequently than  
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FINSTRUCT -0.235 *** -0.134 *** -0.499 *** 0.367 *** 1
FINDEV -0.012 ** -0.094 *** 0.592 *** -0.100 *** -0.865 *** 1
REGRESTR -0.140 *** -0.173 *** 0.346 *** 0.585 *** 0.088 *** 0.078 *** 1
CAPREG 0.209 *** 0.419 *** -0.386 *** 0.223 *** 0.147 *** -0.092 *** -0.406 *** 1
OFFSUP 0.278 *** 0.451 *** -0.270 *** 0.554 *** 0.188 *** -0.127 *** -0.140 *** 0.564 *** 1
PRIVMON 0.379 *** 0.281 *** 0.156 *** -0.109 *** -0.075 *** 0.045 *** -0.191 *** -0.334 *** 0.220 *** 1
DEPISNURANCE -0.079 *** -0.303 *** 0.268 *** -0.393 *** 0.040 *** -0.025 *** 0.321 *** -0.528 *** -0.792 *** -0.078 *** 1
MORALHAZARD 0.020 *** -0.227 *** 0.645 *** -0.073 *** 0.177 *** -0.083 *** 0.491 *** -0.408 *** -0.475 *** -0.0579 *** 0.7258 *** 1
INITCAPSTRINGENCY -0.277 *** -0.121 *** -0.164 *** 0.478 *** 0.014 *** 0.173 *** 0.049 *** 0.605 *** 0.248 *** -0.5839 *** -0.3415 *** -0.240 *** 1
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Table 5. Procyclicality of LLP vs. bank size, bank type and  specialization in unconsolidated data. 
 
 
All the models are estimated with the Blundell-Bond (1998) two step system-GMM estimator for the period of 1996-2010 for panel data with a lagged dependent variable. In each 
regression the dependent variable is the ratio of LLP over average total assets. As explanatory variables, we include two lags of dependent variable, profit before taxes and provisions over 
average assets (PROFIT), the capital over total assets (CAP),  the loan growth rate (∆L), real growth in GDP (GDPG), unemployment rate (UNEMPL), year dummies and country dummies. 
The coefficient of GDPG is the measure of LLP procyclicality. Column 1 shows results for the full sample of unconsolidated data. Columns 2 to 9 show results for the interaction between 
all explanatory variables and a dummy taking the value of 1 if banks fall into one of the criteria describing specific characteristics of banking activity, and zero otherwise. Bank type refers 
to the banks’ being publicly traded or not: publ_trad=1 is  a dummy variable equal to 1 if a bank is a listed company; priv_held=1 is a dummy variable equal to 1 if a bank is privately held.  
Regressions are estimated for each subsample for 1996-2011. Bank specialization refers to four types of banking business models: commercial=1 is a dummy variable equal to 1 if a bank 
operates as a commercial bank; cooperative=1 is a dummy variable equal to 1 if a bank operates as a cooperative bank;  savings=1 is a dummy variable equal to 1 if a bank operates as a 
savings bank.  Bank holding companies have also been considered, but the results for them have not been reported, as due to the limited number of those banks in the sample, the calculated 
coefficients are statistically insignificant. Bank size is captured by total average assets  in the whole research period: large_a20=1 is a dummy variable equal to 1 if a bank belongs to the 
20% corresponding to the largest banks; medium_a40 is a dummy variable equal to 1 if a bank belongs to the next 40% of banks; small_a40=1 is a dummy variable equal to 1 if a bank 
belongs to the last 40% of banks with the smallest assets. 
*, **, *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
t-stat t-stat t-stat t-stat t-stat t-stat t-stat t-stat t-stat
LLP(-1) 0.332 *** 4.8 0.518 *** 5.97 0.328 *** 4.32 0.471 *** 3.74 0.182 *** 3.06 0.502 *** 14.88 0.158 ** 2.08 0.827 *** 3.45 0.328 *** 3.66
LLP(-2) 0.151  1.28 0.069  1.59 0.156  1.3 0.057  0.68 0.113 *** 5.14 -0.064  -1.6 0.078 *** 4.2 0.001  0.01 0.042  0.53
PROFIT 0.303 *** 3.94 0.095 ** 2.51 0.337 *** 3.82 0.247 *** 4 0.542 ** 2.54 0.114 ** 1.98 0.617 *** 3.15 0.201 *** 3.78 0.217 *** 2.76
∆L -0.001 *** -2.86 -0.002  -1.52 -0.001 *** -2.6 0.000 * -1.67 0.000  0.37 0.000 * 1.92 -0.001 * -1.69 0.000  -1.08 0.000  -1.09
CAP -0.027 *** -3.85 0.002  0.2 -0.026 *** -3.84 -0.020  -1.32 -0.050 *** -3.15 -0.008  -1.37 -0.063 *** -2.63 -0.021 *** -2.59 -0.012 * -1.65
GDPG -0.016 *** -7.92 -0.067 *** -6.31 -0.014 *** -6.76 -0.057 *** -6.94 -0.005 ** -2.41 -0.015 *** -6.36 -0.033 *** -5.17 -0.015 *** -5.9 -0.012 *** -2.82
UNEMPL -0.006 * -1.93 0.019 ** 2.52 -0.007 ** -2.13 0.013  1.38 -0.014  -0.7 -0.010 *** -4.29 -0.013  -1.42 -0.003  -0.91 0.005  0.81
Intercept 0.165 ** 2.54 0.064  0.49 0.132 * 1.72 0.064  0.67 0.233 * 1.8 0.305 *** 9.37 0.213 *** 2.68 0.053  0.53 0.145  1.55
AR(1) -3.56 *** -3.07 *** -3.55 *** -3.22 *** -3.08 *** -8.75 *** -2.45 ** -3.9 *** -3.45 ***
AR(2) -0.44  0.19  -0.49  0.12  -2.31 ** 3.77 *** -0.78  2.33 ** -0.19  
Hansen test J statistic 
and p-value of Hansen 
statisitcs
895.23 0.00 115.38 1.00 867.71 0.00 283.64 0.00 645.64 0.00 454.86 0.00 352.08 0.00 526.57 0.00 428.91 0.00
No. of instruments 220 209 217 220 204 203 210 220 213
No. of observations 22096 1247 20849 4443 10687 6928 5069 10088 6939
No. of banks 2119 118 2001 452 1069 593 455 938 726
Specification tests
medium_a40=1 small_a40=1
Bank specific 
variables
Macroeconomic 
variables
Type of variable(s):
full sample publ_trad=1 priv_held=1 commercial=1 cooperative=1 savings=1 large_a20=1
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Table 6. Procyclicality of LLP vs. bank size, bank type and  specialization in consolidated data. 
 
All the models are estimated with the Blundell-Bond (1998) two step system-GMM estimator for the period of 1996-2010 for panel data with a lagged dependent variable. In each 
regression the dependent variable is the ratio of LLP over average total assets. As explanatory variables, we include two lags of dependent variable, profit before taxes and provisions over 
average assets (PROFIT), the capital over total assets (CAP), the loan growth rate (∆L), real growth in GDP (GDPG), unemployment rate (UNEMPL), year dummies and country dummies. 
The coefficient of GDPG is the measure of LLP procyclicality. Bank type refers to the banks’ being publicly traded or not: publ_trad=1is  a dummy variable equal to 1 if a bank is a listed 
company; priv_held=1 is a dummy variable equal to 1 if a bank is privately held.  Regressions are estimated for each subsample for 1996-2011. Bank specialization refers to four types of 
banking business models: commercial=1 is a dummy variable equal to 1 if a bank operates as a commercial bank; cooperative=1 is a dummy variable equal to 1 if a bank operates as a 
cooperative bank;  savings=1 is a dummy variable equal to 1 if a bank operates as a savings bank.  Bank holding companies have also been considered, but the results for them have not 
been reported, as due to the limited number of those banks in the sample, the calculated coefficients are statistically insignificant. Bank size is captured by total average assets  in the whole 
research period: large_a20=1 is a dummy variable equal to 1 if a bank belongs to the 20% corresponding to the largest banks; medium_a40 is a dummy variable equal to 1 if a bank belongs 
to the next 40% of banks; small_a40=1 is a dummy variable equal to 1 if a bank belongs to the last 40% of banks with the smallest assets. 
*, **, *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
t-stat t-stat t-stat t-stat t-stat t-stat t-stat t-stat t-stat t-stat
LLP(-1) 0.1871 * 1.66 0.310 * 1.81 0.144  1.04 0.155  1.41 0.348 *** 3.86 0.426 *** 3.13 0.502 *** 3.64 0.196  1.4 0.649 *** 6.99 0.095 *** 0.64
LLP(-2) -0.0493 * -1.88 -0.100  -0.65 -0.030  -0.9 -0.047  -1.32 0.194 *** 3.09 -0.113 ** -2.24 0.098  0.90 0.078  0.9 -0.116  -1.6 -0.051  -0.84
PROFIT 0.0909 * 1.84 0.337 *** 2.58 0.067  1.64 0.085  1.58 0.128 ** 2.17 0.243 *** 5.83 0.036  0.97 0.409 ** 2 0.138 * 1.74 0.063 *** 1.46
∆L -0.0006  -0.85 0.000  -0.39 -0.001  -1.3 -0.001  -0.78 -0.001  -0.8 0.001  0.27 0.003  1.55 -0.001  -1.2 0.000  -0.7 0.000  0.16
CAP 0.0032  0.43 -0.051  -1.31 0.006  0.94 0.001  0.15 -0.016 *** -2.6 -0.015 * -1.71 0.015  0.86 -0.047  -0.8 -0.009  -0.67 -0.002 * -0.23
0
GDPG -0.0569 *** -8.27 -0.065 *** -8.02 -0.061 *** -6.3 -0.072 *** -6.99 -0.033 *** -7.2 -0.053 *** -4.54 -0.064 *** -4.10 -0.085 *** -7.2 -0.062 *** 0 -0.056 *** -4.34
UNEMPL 0.0060  1.06 0.010  1.36 0.005  0.62 0.013  1.43 -0.008  -1.2 -0.010 ** -2.12 -0.018  -1.10 0.005  0.5 0.002  0.21 -0.010 *** -0.64
Intercept 0.3122 *** 4.34 0.285 * 1.80 0.372 *** 4.35 0.385 *** 3.54 0.239 *** 3.71 0.286 *** 2.91 0.220 ** 2.21 0.202  1.4 0.229 *** 2.74 0.601  3.42
AR(1) -2.710 *** -1.320  -2.410 ** -2.620 *** -2 ** -2.62 *** -1.42  -1.33  -2.06 ** -1.9 *
AR(2) 1.350  0.720  1.070  1.220  -1.09  1.31  -0.78  -0.34  1.57  0.6  
Hansen test J 
statistic and p-value 
of Hansen statisitcs
293.46 0.00 108.18 1.00 231.12 0.20 223.42 0.332 53.49 1.00 33.49 1.00 27.22 1.00 104.16 1.00 140.88 1.00 99.56 1.00
No. of instruments 223 217 222 223 201 201 203 217 218 216
No. of observations 3836 1255 2581 2490 606 411 329 1213 1574 1049
No. of banks 357 112 245 228 59 37 33 107 145 105
Bank specific 
variables
Macroeconomic 
variables
Specification tests
Type of variable(s):
full sample publ_trad=1 priv_held=1 commercial=1 cooperative=1 savings=1 holding=1 large_a20=1 medium_a40=1 small_a40=1
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publicly traded banks reporting in unconsolidated statements. In the case of unconsolidated data, it 
is privately held banks which smooth income more. Consequently, our research suggest that the 
results of the study by Fonseca and Gonzalez (2008) are not necessarily binding – in particular in 
the EU countries. 
The results in tables 5 and 6 also show that LLP of commercial banks seems to be more 
procyclical than LLP of cooperative and savings banks. Moreover, cooperative banks seem to 
employ income smoothing and capital management with the use of LLP more intensively than 
commercial and savings banks. If we account here for the fact that LLP of cooperative banks are 
evidently less sensitive to GDP than commercial and savings (as well as holding banks in the case 
of consolidated data) and at the same time they seem to smooth income more, we may infer that 
more income smoothing coexists with less procyclical LLP. 
Large banks seem to provision the least prudentially, as their coefficient of GDP is negative 
and statistically significant in both unconsolidated and consolidated data. In all bank size 
subsamples (i.e. large, medium and small) the coefficients of GDP in consolidated data are visibly 
higher than those coefficients in unconsolidated data. We may therefore infer that the type of 
financial statement in which banks report matters for procyclicality. The type of financial statement 
in which banks are obliged to report also seems to be of great importance to income smoothing and 
capital management, as in our unconsolidated data sample we find that banks tend to stabilize their 
profit and capital with LLP more, because the coefficients for both PROFIT and CAP are 
considerably higher in this sample.  
In general, if we look at both consolidated and unconsolidated data, we find that the regression 
coefficients for bank specific variables (i.e. PROFIT, CAP and ∆L) are higher (in absolute terms) 
and therefore represent stronger empirical relationship between LLP and those variables in the 
unconsolidated data sample, whereas the regression coefficients for macroeconomic variables (in 
particular the GDPG) are higher (in absolute terms) in consolidated data sample, which suggests 
that banks who are obliged to consolidate their financial statements are more sensitive to 
macroeconomic environment. This leads us to conclude that LLP of banks which stabilize their 
profits and manage capital are less procyclical. Such conclusion goes in line with our hypothesis 
than earnings management by banks may have an impact on procyclicality in banking, with more 
of, e.g., income smoothing applied by banks reducing the sensitivity of LLP to business cycle.  
In Table 7 we present estimates of the coefficient representing relationship between LLP and 
GDP changes across countries. Our results confirm the diversity of LLP procyclicality across EU 
countries.  A negative relation between LLP and GDP in 18 countries in unconsolidated data, and in 
19 countries in consolidated data, is consistent with the LLP procyclicality hypothesis. Only in the 
case of 5 (7) countries in unconsolidated (consolidated) data, this relationship is positive, with 
Malta in consolidated data sample, exhibiting a statistically significant positive impact of GDPG on 
LLP. Therefore, the counter-cyclicality view of LLP is not supported in the sample of EU countries 
which we analyze.  
The observed heterogeneity of sensitivity of LLP to the business cycle has two primary 
consequences. First, this heterogeneity shows how important it is to study national institutional 
environment (i.e. quality of investor protection, regulations and supervision, and financial sector 
structure and development) that may have an effect on how bank managers respond to changing 
macroeconomic conditions when designing the level of LLP in different economic cycle phases.  
Second, this heterogeneity points to the problem of biased estimations obtained with international 
data which fail to account for country specific institutional conditions that may influence bank 
managers incentives to counteract the business cycle. 
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Table 7. Heterogeneity of LLP procyclicality in the EU. 
 
All the models are estimated with the Blundell-Bond (1998) two-step system-GMM estimator for the period of 1996-
2010 for panel data with lagged dependent variable. In each regression dependent variable is the ratio of LLP over 
average total assets. As explanatory variables, we include two lags of the dependent variable, profit before taxes and 
provisions over average assets (PROFIT), capital over total assets (CAP),  loan growth rate (∆L), real growth in GDP 
(GDPG), unemployment rate (UNEMPL), year dummies and country dummies. The coefficient of GDPG is the 
measure of LLP procyclicality. Column 1 shows results for each country separately. Regressions are estimated for each 
country for 1996-2010. For Cyprus, Ireland and Netherlands (unconconsolidated data) and Slovakia and Slovenia 
(consolidated data) the results could not be obtained due to theinsufficient number of observations.  
T-value denotes the t-statisitcs. *, **, *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
 
4.2. Empirical results of cross –country determinants 
 
In Tables 8 and 9  we report results of cross-country determinants of heterogeneity of loan loss 
provisions procyclicality obtained using the two step system GMM estimator with country and time 
dummy variables as instruments.  This estimation is robust to heteroskedasticity and 
autocorrelation. To save space we present results for unconsolidated data, but in our inferences we 
also refer to consolidated data, in particular in the case when there are differences in the direction of 
coefficients measuring the relationship between LLP and interaction terms between GDPG and each 
of the country specific variable. The results presented in Tables 8 show how sensitivity of LLP to 
GDPG is influenced by the quality of investor protection, financial sector structure and financial 
development in both unconsolidated and consolidated data.  
The impact of investor protection on LLP procyclicality is unambiguous, as coefficients of 
ANTISELDEALING and EXANTECONTROL differ between unconsolidated and consolidated 
data. Better investor protection seems to increase the procyclicality of LLP in unconsolidated data 
sample, and decrease the negative impact of GDPG on LLP in consolidated data. This may suggest 
that higher quality of investor protection influences decisions of managers of banks who report in 
consolidated statements in a way which results in reduced procyclicality of LLP.  However, in the 
COUNTRY t-value t-value
AUSTRIA -0.006  -0.86 101.3 107 1105 -0.039 ** -2.31 14.8 24 271
BELGIUM -0.037  -1.11 13.3 22 234 -0.030 *** -3.92 5.22 13 136
BULGARIA -0.049  -1.38 3.03 11 107 -0.436 ** -2.47 0 4 46
CYPRUS 2 18 0.221  0.94 0 3 37
CZECH REPUBLIC -0.031  -0.66 0 6 49 -1.048  -1.51 0 5 58
DENMARK -0.143 *** -10.97 65.07 70 821 -0.116 * -1.91 12.4 17 202
ESTONIA 0.063  0.56 3 34 -0.147 ** -2.19 0 4 39
FINLAND 0.000  0.03 3 33 -0.050  -1.13 0 5 51
FRANCE -0.037 *** -3.05 137.4 142 1568 -0.025 ** -2.25 58 66 662
GERMANY -0.003  -1.27 798.8 1157 13255 0.020  0.4 6.55 15 175
GREECE 0.056  0.44 0 7 64 0.033  0.53 1.58 10 112
HUNGARY 0.078  0.71 0 3 30 0.274  1.39 0 7 77
IRELAND -0.330  -0.42 0 6 63
ITALY -0.016 *** -5.35 204.6 395 3075 -0.038 *** -3.89 25 28 281
LATVIA -0.077  -0.96 7.67 13 110 -0.160 ** -2.07 0 3 29
LITHUANIA -0.269  -1 0 8 81 -0.102  -0.6 0 6 60
LUXEMBOURG -0.010  -1.58 32.33 36 325 -0.135  -1.43 0 8 86
MALTA 0.240  1.37 0 2 19 0.179 ** 2.18 0 2 26
NETHERLANDS 1 9 -0.033 * -1.63 7.77 15 173
POLAND -0.113 * -1.82 12.42 19 173 -3.374  -1.33 0 7 72
PORTUGAL 0.008  0.18 0.61 8 69 -0.019  -0.6 8.24 15 162
ROMANIA -0.240 * -1.63 2.58 11 93 2 20
SLOVAKIA -0.405  -1.19 0 6 49 5 54
SLOVENIA -0.081 * -1.7 0.89 10 97 -0.024  -0.2 0 7 85
SPAIN -0.051 *** -4.28 39.52 54 480 -0.043 *** -3.48 35 38 414
SWEDEN -0.012  -0.67 2.88 10 85 0.007  0.17 0 6 59
UK -0.043  -0.23 4.78 13 113 -0.095 *** -3.73 33.1 36 386
No. of 
banks
No. of 
observations
UNCONSOLIDATED CONSOLIDATED
Heterogeneity 
of procyclicality
Hansen 
test
No. of 
banks
No. of 
observations
Heterogeneity of 
procyclicality
Hansen 
test
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case of banks reporting in unconsolidated statements’ format, better investor protection does little to 
reduce the procyclicality of LLP. Of the constituent parts of ANTISELFDEALING, considered in 
our study, only EXPOSTCONTROL has the expected positive impact on procyclicality,  as it 
makes LLP less procyclical in both unconsolidated and consolidated data. The positive coefficient 
of interaction term between CREDITORP and GDPG indicates that higher quality of protection of 
lenders’ rights reduces the procyclicality of LLP (both in unconsolidated and consolidated data).  
The sensitivity of LLP to interactions between both financial sector structure (FINSTR) and 
financial sector development (FINDEV) and GDPG depends on the format of financial statements 
in which banks report. In the sample of unconsolidated data, the coefficient of FINSTRxGDPG is  
negative, which indicates that banks which operate in financial sectors with increased share of stock 
markets, are more sensitive to the business cycle. The negative impact of the structure of financial 
sector seems to be alleviated by better development of the financial sector, as the coefficient of 
FINDEVxGDPG is positive in unconsolidated data. The opposite result is found for banks who are 
obliged to report consolidated financial information, as the coefficient of FINSTRxGDPG is 
positive, suggesting reduced impact of macroeconomic environment on LLP of banks which 
conduct their business in financial sectors with a greater role of stock markets. This positive effect 
is however eliminated by the development of the financial sector, as banks reporting in consolidated 
format and operating in well developed financial sectors, seem to be more sensitive to the business 
cycle when taking decisions about the levels of LLP. This negative effect of financial development 
on the procyclicality of LLP may stem from increased competition between banks and non-banks in 
better developed financial sectors. This increased competition is usually associated with increased 
risk taking (in particular during economic booms) (see e.g., Keeley, 1990; Allen and Gale, 2004; 
Boyd and de Nicolό, 2005; Martinez-Miera and Repullo, 2010; Beck et al., 2006, 2007; Schaek et 
al., 2009; Craig and Dinger, 2013; Fu et al. 2014), which results in increased procyclicality in 
banking (see e.g. Borio and Zhu, 2012).  
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Table 8. Impact of investor protection as well as the financial structure and development on the heterogeneity of LLP procyclicality in 
unconsolidated data 
 
All the models are estimated with the Blundell-Bond (1991) two step system-GMM estimator for the period of 1996-2011 for panel data with a lagged dependent variable. In each 
regression the dependent variable is the ratio of LLP over average total assets. As explanatory variables, we include two lags of the dependent variable, profit before taxes and provisions 
over average assets (PROFIT), capital over total assets (CAP),  loan growth rate (∆L), real growth in GDP (GDPG), unemployment rate (UNEMPL), year dummies and country dummies. 
The coefficient of GDPG is the measure of LLP procyclicality. ANTISELFDEALING is a new measure of legal protection of minority shareholders against expropriation by corporate 
insiders. EXANTECONTROL measures the investor protection before the contract is signed. EXPOSTCONTROL measures the investor protection after the decision is made. 
CREDITORP is creditor rights protection index aggregating creditor rights.  FINSTR is the index corresponding to financial sector structure. FINDEV is the measure of financial sector 
development.   
*, **, *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
 
 
1 t-stat 2 t-stat 3 t-stat 4 t-stat 5 t-stat 6 t-stat
LLP(-1) 0.347 *** 4.68 0.349 *** 4.73 0.335 *** 4.67 0.313 *** 3.82 0.280 *** 4.52 0.284 *** 4.64
LLP(-2) 0.180  1.58 0.163  1.42 0.140  1.17 0.143  1.11 0.134  1.08 0.145  1.22
PROFIT 0.332 *** 4.21 0.332 *** 4.21 0.318 *** 3.99 0.292 *** 3.37 0.306 *** 3.96 0.313 *** 4.1
∆L 0.000 * -1.9 -0.001 ** -2.3 0.000 *** -2.6 0.000  -1.6 0.000  -1.1 0.000  -0.9
CAP -0.039 *** -4.5 -0.039 *** -4.2 -0.031 *** -3.7 -0.024 *** -2.9 -0.025 *** -3.4 -0.028 *** -4.4
GDPG -0.064 *** -4.7 -0.039 *** -5.1 -0.019 *** -6.7 -0.089 *** -4.5 -0.040 *** -4.2 -0.054 *** -5.8
UNEMPL -0.009 ** -2.5 -0.013 *** -2.8 -0.008 ** -2.3 -0.001 *** -0.4 -0.003 *** -0.6 0.000 * 0.07
Intercept 0.351 *** 5.19 0.324 *** 5.03 0.211 *** 3.71 0.111 ** 2.12 0.233 *** 3.25 0.276 *** 3.53
 ANTISELFDEALING 1.290 *** 4.21
GDPG x ANTISELFDEALING -0.504 *** -4.1
 EXANTECONTROL 0.988 *** 4.03
GDPG x EXANTECONTROL -0.359 *** -3.9
 EXPOSTCONTROL -0.410  -1.5
GDPG x EXPOSTCONTROL 0.193 *** 2.68
 CREDITORP 0.003  0.15
GDPG x CREDITORP 0.030 *** 3.97
FINSTRUCT 0.806 * 1.95
GDPG x FINSTRUCT -0.313 *** -2.8
FINDEV -1.237 *** -3.4
GDPG x FINDEV 0.378 *** 4.79
AR(1) -3.57 *** -3.55 *** -3.49 *** -3.16 *** -3.69 *** -3.65 ***
AR(2) -0.71  -0.61  -0.45  -0.54  -0.48  -0.55  
Hansen test J statistic and p-value 
of Hansen statistics
911.12 0.000 908.21 0.000 882.81 0.000 813.48 0.000 881.76 0.000 903.59 0.000
No. of instruments 216 216 216 216 220 220
No. of obsevations 21928 21928 21928 21700 22096 22096
No. of banks 2102 2102 2102 2076 2119 2119
Interactions
Specification tests
Type of variable(s):
Bank specific variables
Macroeconomic variables
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Table 9. Impact of regulations and supervision on the heterogeneity of LLP procyclicality in unconsolidated data 
 
All the models are estimated with the Blundell-Bond (1998) two step system-GMM estimator for the period of 1996-2011 for panel data with a lagged dependent variable. In each 
regression the dependent variable is the ratio of LLP over average total assets. As explanatory variables, we include two lags of dependent variable, profit before taxes and provisions over 
average assets (PROFIT), capital over total assets (CAP),  loan growth rate (∆L), real growth in GDP (GDPG), unemployment rate (UNEMPL), year dummies and country dummies. The 
coefficient on GDPG is the measure of LLP procyclicality. REGRESTR is the measure of regulatory restrictions on bank activities. CAPREG is the measure of overall stringency of capital 
requirements. INITCAPSTRINGENCY is the initial capital stringency index. OFFSUP is the measure of official supervisory power. PRIVMON is measured by private monitoring index. 
DEPINSURANCE is the index measuring  the power of the deposit insurer.  MORALHAZARD is the index which measures various factors mitigating moral hazard.   
*, **, *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
Type of variable(s): 1 t-stat 2 t-stat 3 t-stat 4 t-stat 5 t-stat 6 t-stat 7 t-stat
LLP(-1) 0.343 *** 4.7 0.333 *** 4.86 0.322 *** 3.9 0.333 *** 4.82 0.328 *** 4.07 0.310 *** 5.1 0.354 *** 4.28
LLP(-2) 0.153  1.2 0.157  1.31 0.185  1.6 0.140  1.18 0.193  1.55 0.046  0.7 0.070  1.14
PROFIT 0.312 *** 4.1 0.309 *** 3.91 0.296 *** 3.5 0.303 *** 3.93 0.320 *** 2.97 0.275 *** 3.2 0.230 *** 2.68
∆L -0.001 ** -2.3 -0.001 *** -2.64 0.000  0.2 -0.001 *** -3.16 0.000  -0.74 0.000 ** -2.1 0.000 * -1.7
CAP -0.026 ** -2.3 -0.027 *** -3.29 -0.024 *** -3.3 -0.032 *** -4.18 -0.042 *** -2.77 -0.026 *** -3.7 -0.023 *** -3.04
GDP -0.021 *** -6.3 -0.064 ** -2.08 -0.277 *** -4.8 0.130 *** 2.63 0.526 *** 3.75 0.003  0.5 -0.038 * -1.91
UNEMPL -0.006 * -1.7 -0.005 *** -1.33 0.002  0.6 -0.006 ** -2.02 0.000  0.06 -0.007 *** -2.2 -0.007 ** -1.98
Intercept 0.136 ** 2.6 0.139  0.21 0.495 *** 4 -0.198 ** -2.3 -1.010 *** -2.93 0.277 *** 4.6 0.311 * 3.69
REGRESTR -0.023  -0.2
GDPG x REGRESTR 0.074 *** 3.7
CAPREG 0.003  1.58
GDPG x CAPREG 0.008  1.35
INITCAPSTRINGENCY -0.147 *** -4
GDPG x INITCAPSTRINGENCY 0.095 *** 4.6
OFFSUP 0.037 *** 4.05
GDPG x OFFSUP -0.013 *** -2.95
PRIVMON 0.164 *** 3.4
GDPG x PRIVMON -0.075 *** -3.81
DEPSINSURANCE -0.013  -1.1
GDPG x DEPISNURANCE -0.017 *** -2.8
MORALHAZARD -0.040 ** -1.24
GDPG x MORALHAZARD 0.017 ** 1.31
AR(1) -3.62 *** -3.54 *** -3.33 *** -3.63 *** -3.37 *** -3.81 *** -3.28 ***
AR(2) -0.46  -0.46  -0.87  -0.35  -0.82  0.21  0.11  
Hansen test J statistic and p-value of 
Hansen statisitics 902.83 0.00 866.88 0.00 826.70 0.00 893.72 0.00 828.16 0.00 882.24 0.00 878.16 0.00
No. of instruments 220 220 219 220 217 215 214
No. of observations 22096 22096 21771 22096 18523 21613 21308
No. of banks 2119 2119 2083 2119 1669 2070 2036
Interactions
Specification tests
Bank specific variables
Macroeconomic variables
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Table 9 shows that restrictive regulatory environment, described by REGRESTR, CAPREG 
and INITCAPSTRINGENCY, reduces the procyclicality of LLP. Our results thus seem to be in line 
with the expectation that more restrictive regulation limiting the range of bank activities 
(REGRESTR) and enhancing the quality of bank capital (CAPREG and  INITCAPSTRINGENCY), 
reduce the risk taking behavior by banks and make their activities less procyclical.  
The negative coefficient of OFFSUP indicates that official supervision is not able to affect 
risk taking by EU banks. However, if we include OFFSUP and its interaction with GDP into the 
model, the impact of the business cycle on LLP turns positive, suggesting countercyclical LLP. The 
same conclusion may be drawn for private supervision proxied by PRIVMON, since the 
relationship between  GDPGxPRIVMON nad LLP is negative, but the coefficient of GDPG is 
positive. Generally, our results suggest that more restrictive supervision is not effective in reducing 
risk appetite of banks operating in the EU. 
A negative statistically significant coefficient of GDPGxDEPSINSURANCE suggests that 
more power of deposit insurer does not limit moral hazard of banks in the EU and thus is not 
successful in limiting bank risk taking, which results in a procyclical pattern of LLP across EU 
banks. However, the negative impact of the power of deposit insurer seems to be alleviated by 
moral hazard mitigating factors, as the coefficient of  GDPGxMORALHAZARD is positive.   
 
4.3. Empirical results for the impact of income smoothing, capital 
management and credit  risk management on the procyclicality of 
LLP 
 
In this section we present how sensitivity of LLP is influenced by the accounting of loan 
loss provisioning. Due to insufficient number of individual bank data, we focus here on banks 
which report their accounting figures in unconsolidated statement format. In table 10 we show some 
basic descriptive statistics of PROCI, ISI,CMI and RMI, which are our indicators measuring the 
sensitivity of LLP to business cycle (PROCI), income smoothing, capital management and risk 
management. The statistics refer to all estimated indicators (both statistically significant and 
statistically insignificant), and to those indicators which are statistically significant at the 
conventional level of at least 10%.   
Loan loss provisions at individual bank level are procyclical  in an average bank, as the 
mean values of all PROCI indicators are negative. Negative, but slightly higher values of median 
PROCI indicators as well as negative values of skew suggest a negative skew of PROCI 
distribution. Positive maximum values of some PROCI suggest that in our EU sample we have 
banks whose loan loss provisions are countercyclical. Positive mean and median values of ISI 
indicators suggest that EU banks do apply earnings management. However, in the case of some 
banks the values of ISI are negative, suggesting no income smoothing. Individual EU banks also 
seem to apply loan loss accounting to manage capital, as the average and median value of CMI is 
negative. In our individual banks sample we also find some evidence of  risk management, since the 
mean and median values of RMI are positive in the full sample of 1220 banks, and only slightly 
negative in the sample of 91 banks for which we could obtain statistically significant indicators at 
the 10% level, for both PROCI and RMI indicators. 
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Table10. Descriptive statistics of indicators 
 
R1 and R2 stand for regression type 1 and regression type 2 measures of the sensitivity defined in section 3.3.2. PROCI 
– an individual bank’s measure of the sensitivity of LLP to the business cycle. PROCI1 and PROCI2 denote the 
sensitivity of LLP to GDPG and GDPG per capita, respectively. ISI – an individual bank’s measure of income 
smoothing, CMI – an individual bank’s measure of capital management, RMI – an individual bank’s measure of credit 
risk management. The results refer to banks which report financial statements in an unconsolidated format. 
 
In Table 11 we present estimation of Eq. (IV) in which we regress individual bank measures 
of sensitivity of loan loss provisions to the business cycle (PROCI) with individual bank indicators 
of income smoothing (ISI), capital management (CMI) and risk management (RMI), with respect to 
all indicators for which we were able to obtain individual bank data, including both the statistically 
significant and insignificant. Our results point to the positive impact of income smoothing and risk 
management on sensitivity of loan loss provisions to the business cycle, as the regression 
coefficients are positive and statistically significant for both ISI and RMI indicators estimated with 
regression type one, and statistically significant for ISI in the case of regression type 2 indicators. 
The negative and statistically significant relationship between PROCI and CMI suggests that 
negative sensitivity of LLP to the business cycle is slightly reduced in the case of banks whose 
managers apply loan loss accounting to manage capital (see panel 2 of Table 11). In general, our 
results in table 11 provide empirical support to our prediction of more income smoothing and more 
prudent risk management. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PROCI1 
R1
PROCI2 
R1
ISI R1
CMI 
R1
RMI 
R1
PROCI1 
R2
PROCI2 
R2
ISI R2
CMI 
R2
RMI 
R2
PROCI1 
R1 
ISI R1 
PROCI1 
R1 
RMI R1
Mean -0.016 -0.016 0.240 -0.029 0.001 -0.013 -0.014 0.313 -0.066 0.001 -0.039 0.288 -0.074 -0.005
Median -0.005 -0.006 0.219 -0.015 0.001 -0.005 -0.006 0.300 -0.038 0.001 -0.038 0.332 -0.052 -0.005
Min. -1.706 -1.941 -2.879 -1.356 -0.106 -1.873 -1.794 -3.810 -2.745 -0.112 -0.557 -2.879 -1.047 -0.091
Max. 0.930 1.226 2.557 1.741 0.032 0.827 0.559 4.318 2.781 0.030 0.172 2.190 0.172 0.032
S.E. 0.092 0.098 0.447 0.247 0.010 0.091 0.087 0.540 0.459 0.010 0.114 0.658 0.159 0.018
Skew -6.498 -6.3068 -0.36 -0.3 -2.93 -7.488 -7.9341 -0.63 0.321 -2.94 -1.37711 -1.158 -3.05082 -1.723
Kurtosis 118.938 153.135 4.43 7.208 24.25 156.541 151.656 8.436 6.447 26.15 3.72781 4.7527 14.8635 5.5551
No. of banks 1120 1120 1120 1120 1120 1120 1120 1120 1120 1120 123 123 91 91
all individual bank's regression type 1 and 2 coefficient values, both statistically significant 
and insignificant
individual bank's regression type 1 
coefficient values significant up to the 
10% level
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Table 11. Effect of income smoothing, capital management and risk management on 
procyclicality of LLP. 
 
All the models are obtained with the use of an OLS estimator with standard errors of regression coefficients robust to 
heteroscedasticity. The dependent variable is PROCI which measures the sensitivity of an individual bank’s LLP to the 
business cycle. PROCI1 and PROCI2 denote sensitivity of LLP to GDPG and GDPG per capita, respectively. 
Independent variables include: ISI – an individual bank’s measure of income smoothing, CMI – an individual bank’s 
measure of capital management, RMI – an individual bank’s measure of credit risk management. R1 and R2 stand for 
regression type 1 and regression type 2 measures of the sensitivity defined in section 3.3.2, respectively. The results 
refer to banks which report financial statements in an unconsolidated format. **, *** denote significance at 5% and 1% 
level, respectively. 
Our results presented in Table 11 are further supported by estimation coefficients shown in 
Table 12, in which we run single OLS regression investigating the relationship between loan loss 
provisions sensitivity to the business cycle and income smoothing (left hand panel of Table 12) and 
risk management (right hand panel of Table 12) for those ISI, RMI and PROCI indicators which are 
statistically significant at the conventional level of at least 10%. The regression coefficient between 
PROCI and ISI shown in Table 12 is over two times higher  than the respective coefficient in Table 
11. The same can be inferred for the regression coefficient between PROCI and RMI. Thus our 
results in table 12 provide strong evidence for the view that banks which engage in earnings 
stabilizing strategies or set their loan loss prudently to account for changes in default risk of their 
loan portfolio, are less affected by macroeconomic environment. This conclusion is visualized in 
Figure 1, which presents the regression plot of loan loss provisions procyclicality as well as income 
smoothing and risk management.  
 
Dep var.: 
PROCI
Indep. variables:coef. t-stat. coef. t-stat. coef. t-stat. coef. t-stat.
ISI 0.042 5.112 *** 0.042 5.092 *** 0.042 5.019 *** 0.042 5.008 ***
CMI 0.000 0.035 0.009 0.720
RMI 1.939 2.831 *** 1.940 2.846 *** 1.817 2.539 ** 1.828 2.570 **
const -0.028 -7.358 *** -0.028 -7.115 *** -0.027 -7.139 *** -0.028 -6.903 ***
R2 0.095 0.095 0.080 0.079
Adj. R
2 0.093 0.094 0.078 0.078
F-statistic 9.629 14.343 9.538 14.296
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
No. of banks 1120 1120 1120 1120
Dep var.: 
PROCI
Indep. variables:coef. t-stat. coef. t-stat. coef. t-stat. coef. t-stat.
ISI 0.019 3.336 *** 0.024 3.32 *** 0.020 3.547 *** 0.024 3.465 ***
CMI -0.011 -2.424 ** -0.011 -2.31 ** -0.010 -2.207 ** -0.010 -2.123 **
RMI 1.095 1.310 0.973 1.228
const -0.021 -5.991 *** -0.021 -5.62 *** -0.021 -6.393 *** -0.022 -6.018 ***
R2 0.036 0.022 0.036 0.024
Adj. R2 0.034 0.021 0.033 0.022
F-statistic 5.844 7.258 5.748 7.191
Prob(F-statistic) 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
No. of banks 1120 1120 1120 1120
2. Regression type 2 procyclicality and earnings managment measures
PROCI1 R2 PROCI1 R2 PROCI2 R2 PROCI2 R2
1. Regression type 1 procyclicality and earnings managment measures
PROCI1 R1 PROCI 1 R1 PROCI2 R1 PROCI2 R1
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Table 12. Impact of income smoothing and risk management on sensitivity of LLP to the 
business cycle for statistically significant values of ISI, RMI and PROCI 
 
All the models are obtained with the use of an OLS estimator with standard errors of regression coefficients robust to 
heteroscedasticity. The dependent variable is PROCI which measures the sensitivity of an individual bank’s LLP to the 
business cycle. PROCI1 denotes sensitivity of LLP to GDPG. Independent variables include: ISI – an individual bank’s 
measure of income smoothing and RMI – an individual bank’s measure of credit risk management. R1 stands for 
regression type 1 measure of the sensitivity defined in section 3.3.2. Only the statistically significant values of PROCI, 
ISI and RMI were included in the models. The results refer to banks which report financial statements in an 
unconsolidated format. *** denotes significance at 1% level. 
 
Figure 1. Regression plot of loan loss provisions sensitivity to the business cycle  measure 
(PROCI)  against income smoothing measure (ISI) (left graph, a) and risk management 
measure (RMI) (right graph, b) (for statistically significant values of PROCI, ISI and RMI). 
 
 
4.4. Sensitivity Analysis 
Our results are robust to several robustness checks First, we rerun the regressions in Tables 5 and 6 
using the real growth rate of GDP per capita instead of real GDP growth rate. Our results are not 
affected by this change.  Second, we have also applied different methods of bank size identification, 
i.e. we adjusted percentiles for large, medium and small banks’ identification – instead of 20%, 
40% and 40% for large, medium and small banks we took, respectively, 20%,40% and 40%. The 
conclusions for the role of bank size in the LLP procyclicality are supported in these additional 
estimations as well. Third, as our dataset covers years 1996-2011, and throughout this period Barth, 
Caprio and Levine have conducted four surveys on bank regulations and supervision around the 
Dep var.: Dep var.: 
Indep. variables: coef. t-stat. Indep. variables: coef. t-stat.
ISI 0.096 4.083 *** RMI 5.636 8.130 ***
const -0.067 -5.143 *** const -0.043 -3.244 ***
R
2 0.307 R
2 0.426
Adj. R
2 0.301 Adj. R
2 
0.420
F-statistic 16.666 F-statistic 11.019
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000 Prob(F-statistic) 0.001
No. of banks 123 No. of banks 91
PROCI1 R1 PROCI1 R1
a. b.
-0.6
-0.5
-0.4
-0.3
-0.2
-0.1
 0
 0.1
 0.2
-3 -2 -1  0  1  2
PR
O
C
I
ISI
empirical
regression line
-1.2
-1
-0.8
-0.6
-0.4
-0.2
 0
 0.2
-0.08 -0.06 -0.04 -0.02  0  0.02
PR
O
C
I
RMI
empirical
regression line
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world (Barth et al., 2013) we have also rerun regressions in Table 9 by applying indicators of 
regulatory and supervisory restrictiveness which were developed by Barth in 1999, 2003 and 2011, 
instead of indicators of 2006. Our estimations results are not significantly altered in those additional 
regressions. 
5. Conclusions 
We have used a panel database of banks from 27 EU countries to explore how loan loss provisions 
respond to the business cycle. We have applied the GMM Arellano and Bond (1991) estimator, 
updated with Roodman (2009) procedure, to control for potential endogeneity and unobserved 
heterogeneity of the explanatory variables. This paper documents a large cross-bank and cross-
country variation in the relationship between loan loss provisions and the business cycle and 
explores bank management specific, bank activity specific and country specific (institutional and 
regulatory) features that explain this diversity.  
The factors explaining differences in LLP sensitivity to the business cycle across EU banks 
and countries are many and varied. Our results indicate that LLP in large, publicly traded and 
commercial banks are more procyclical than in other subsamples.  
Better investor protection and more restrictive bank regulations reduce the procyclicality of 
LLP. Additional evidence shows that moral hazard resulting from deposit insurance results in more 
procyclicality of LLP. We do not find support for the view that better quality of market monitoring 
mitigates the procyclical behavior of banks. 
  This study is relevant to the current policy debate on the role of size in procyclical behaviour 
of banks. In particular we provide new evidence that large systemically important banks should be 
regulated more restrictively, as they have a tendency to take on more risks, as is evident in our 
results for banks which are obliged to report in consolidated statements’ format. This gives support 
to the Basel Committee capital standards for systemically important financial institutions (SIFIs), 
included in the Basel III framework.  
Additionally, as our results suggest the importance of bank regulations in limiting the risk 
taking activity by banks, and therefore limiting procyclicality in banking, we provide strong support 
for contemporary attempts to make banking sector better regulated. Our results are also important to 
current macroprudential policy proposals, promoting the forward looking provisioning (by the Basel 
Committee and other international institutions, such as the International Monetary Fund). In 
particular, we find support for the view that more income smoothing and prudent risk management 
result in less procyclicality of LLP. 
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